No-Regret with Bounded Computational Capacity by Ehud Lehrer & Eilon Solan
No-Regret with Bounded Computational
Capacity
Ehud Lehrer∗ and Eilon Solan†
June 9, 2003
Abstract
We deal with no regret and related aspects of vector-payoﬀ games
when one of the players is limited in computational capacity. We show
that player 1 can almost approach with bounded-recall strategies, or
with ﬁnite automata, any convex set which is approachable when no
capacity bound is present. In particular we deduce that with bounded
computational capacity player 1 can ensure having almost no regret.
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11 Introduction
In a sequential decision problem, at every stage a decision maker (DM) ought
to take an action. He then receives a stage-payoﬀ that depends on both his
stage-action and on the realized state of nature. The evolution of the state
of nature is independent of the actions taken by DM. A strategy of DM is
a prescription what he should do (possibly randomly choosing an action)
after any possible history of previous actions and past realized states. A
strategy is Hannan no-regret if it ensures a long-run average payoﬀ that is
at least as high as what DM could have achieved had he played constantly
the same action. In other words, playing a Hannan no-regret strategy, DM
has no-regret for not constantly playing a best response against the empirical
distribution of states.
Hannan (1957) showed in a rather complicated proof that if there are
ﬁnitely many state of nature, there is always a Hannan no-regret strategy.
This theorem can be derived from Blackwell’s (1956a) approachability the-
orem, which applies to two-player games with vector payoﬀs. Both proofs
employ strategies that are not computationally bounded.
Two types of strategies with bounded computational capacity has been
extensively studied in the literature. First, strategies with bounded-recall
(see, e.g., Lehrer, 1988, Watson, 1994, and J´ ehiel, 1995), which can use only
the recent history, and second, strategies that can be implemented by ﬁnite
automata (see, e.g., Aumann, 1981, Neyman, 1985, Rubinstein, 1986, and
Ben Porath, 1990).
The relation between various notions of no regret and repeated games
with vector payoﬀs is now well established. Repeated games with vector
payoﬀs are two-player zero-sum games in which the payoﬀs are not scalars,
but vectors in some Euclidean space. Such games naturally arise when the
players have several objective functions. Foster and Vohra (1999) used games
with vector payoﬀs to show a process of decentralized actions that converges
to correlated equilibrium. Fudenberg and Levine (1999) and Hart and Mas-
2Colell (2000) introduced stronger no-regret notions than Hanann’s notion,
and show that there always exists a strategy that satisﬁes the stronger ver-
sion. Rustichini (1999), using Balckwell’s approachability theorem, proved a
no-regret theorem when the decision maker has imperfect monitoring. Lehrer
(2003) used games whose payoﬀs are inﬁnite dimensional to show that there
exists a strategy immunized against inﬁnitely many replacing schemes.
To ﬁnd the simplest structure of Hannan no-regret strategies we will
analyze repeated games with vector payoﬀs. For a given sequential decision
problem one can deﬁne a certain repeated game with vector payoﬀs such that
(a) the set of strategies of DM in the decision problem stands in 1-1 relation
with the set of strategies of player 1 in the repeated game with vector payoﬀs,
and (b) a strategy of DM is Hannan no-regret if and only if the corresponding
strategy in the repeated game with payoﬀ vectors ensures that the long-run
average payoﬀ remains close to the non-negative orthant.
Thus, we are led to a more general question in the setup of repeated games
with vector payoﬀs, namely, the characterization of sets in a Euclidean space
with the property that player 1 can guarantee that the long-run average
payoﬀ remains close to the set.
In a repeated game with vector payoﬀs, a target set is approachable by
player 1 if he has a strategy that ensures that the long-run average payoﬀ
is as close as required to the target set, regardless of the strategy player 2
employs (see Blackwell, 1956a). The target set is approachable with bounded-
recall strategies by player 1 if for any vicinity of the target set there is a
bounded-recall strategy of player 1, which guarantees that the long-run av-
erage payoﬀ remains in this vicinity. The set is approachable with automata
by player 1 if the same can be done using strategies that can be implemented
by ﬁnite automata. Since any bounded-recall strategy can be implemented
by an automaton, any set which is approachable with bounded-recall strate-
gies is also approachable by automaton. However, it is not clear that the
converse holds. As we prove below, the two notions of approachability with
3bounded computational capacity strategies are equivalent. Moreover, we
fully characterize the family of sets which are approachable with bounded-
recall strategies. A minimal (with respect to set inclusion) approachable set
is approachable with bounded-recall strategies if and only if it is convex. Fur-
thermore, a set is approachable with bounded-recall strategies if and only if
it contains a convex approachable set. A complete characterization of the
family of minimal approachable set was given by Spinat (2002).
Back to the issue of Hannan no-regret strategies, since the non-negative
orthant is approachable in the corresponding repeated game with vector-
payoﬀs, and is a convex set, our results imply that in any sequential decision
problem, DM has a bounded-recall strategy that is almost Hannan no-regret.
That is, for every given δ > 0, there is a bounded-recall strategy for which
the regret is at most δ, in the long run.
2 The Model and the Main Results
2.1 Repeated games with vector-payoﬀs
In this section we deﬁne repeated games with vector-payoﬀs.
A two-player repeated game with vector-payoﬀs is a triplet (I,J,M), where
I and J are ﬁnite sets of actions for the two players, and M = (mi,j)i∈I,j∈J
is a vector-payoﬀ matrix, so that mi,j ∈ Rd for every i ∈ I and j ∈ J. We
assume throughout that kMk∞ ≤ 1; that is, all payoﬀs are bounded by 1.
We also assume that |I| ≥ 2: player 1 has at least two available actions.
At every stage n the two players choose, independently and simultane-
ously, a pair of actions (in,jn), each one in his action set. A strategy of
player 1 (resp. player 2) is a function σ : ∪∞
n=0(I × J)n → ∆(I) (resp. τ :
∪∞
n=0(I ×J)n → ∆(J)),1 where ∆(A) is the space of probability distributions
over A = I,J. We denote by S and T the strategy spaces of the players 1
and 2, respectively.
1For every ﬁnite set B we identify B0 with a set that contains a single element.
4For every stage t denote by it and jt the actions of the players 1 and 2 at






Note that for every n ∈ N, ¯ xn is a random variable whose distribution is
determined by the strategies of both players.
Let d(x,y) denote the Euclidean distance between the points x and y in
Rd. For every set F in Rd and every x ∈ Rd, let d(x,F) = infy∈F d(x,y) be
the distance of x from F. For every δ > 0, let B(F,δ) = {x ∈ Rd: d(x,F)) ≤
δ} be the set of all points which are δ-close to F.
Deﬁnition 1 A set F is approachable by player 1 if there exists a strategy
σ ∈ S such that
∀ε > 0,∀η > 0,∃N,∀τ ∈ T , Pσ,τ(sup
n≥N
d(¯ xn,F) ≥ ε) < η.
In this case we say that σ approaches F.
A set F is approachable if player 1 can guarantee with arbitrarily high prob-
ability that the long-run average payoﬀ will be as close to F as he wishes.
Blackwell (1956a) provided a suﬃcient condition for a set to be approach-
able. Spinat (2002) fully characterized the family of approachable sets.
2.2 On bounded-capacity strategies
In this section we deﬁne two types of bounded-capacity strategies, namely,
strategies with bounded-recall and strategies that can be implemented by
automata. We then combine the notion of approachability with those two
types of strategies.
Let k be a natural number. A k-bounded-recall strategy of player 1
(resp. player 2) is a pair (m,σ) (resp. (m,τ)), where m ∈ (I × J)k, and
5σ : (I × J)k → ∆(I) (resp. τ : (I × J)k → ∆(J)). When playing a k-
bounded-recall strategy (m,σ), at any stage player 1 plays σ(x), where x is
the string of the last k joint actions. He starts the game with the (virtual)
memory of m. Thus, at the ﬁrst stage he plays the mixed action σ(m), at the
second stage he plays σ(m0,i1,j1), where m0 are the ﬁrst k − 1 coordinates
of m and (i1,j1) is the realized pair of actions of the two players at the ﬁrst
stage, and so on.
We denote by SBR the set of all bounded-recall strategies of player 1.
A (non-deterministic) automaton A is given by (i) a ﬁnite set of states,
(ii) a probability distribution over the set of states, according to which the
initial state is chosen, (iii) a ﬁnite set of inputs, (iv) a ﬁnite set of outputs, (v)
a function that assigns to every state a probability distribution over outputs,
and (vi) a transition rule, that assigns to every state and every input a
probability distribution over states. The number of states of the automaton
is the size of the automaton.
The initial state of the automaton is chosen according to the initial dis-
tribution given in (ii). At every stage, as a function of the current state and
of the input, an output is chosen by the probability distribution given in (v),
and a new state is chosen according to the probability distribution given in
(vi).
The literature usually assumes that one state is designated as the initial
state. Since the state of the automaton is not observed, as the automaton
evolves an outside observer may only infer a posterior probability over the
current state of the automaton using past inputs and outputs. It is therefore
more convenient to assume that the initial state is chosen at random.
When the set of inputs of the automaton is the set I×J of pairs of actions,
and the set of outputs is the set I of actions of player 1, an automaton deﬁnes
a strategy for player 1: at each stage player 1 simply plays the action which is
the output of the automaton at that stage, and the input for the automaton
is the pair of actions just played by both players.
6We denote by SA the set of all strategies of player 1 that can be imple-
mented by an automaton.
Remark 1 Every k-bounded-recall strategy can be implemented by an au-
tomaton with |I × J|k states.
We are interested in studying when a given set is approachable by an
automaton and by a bounded-recall strategy.
Deﬁnition 2 A set F is approachable with bounded-recall strategies (resp.
approachable with automata) by player 1 if for every δ > 0 there exists a
strategy σ ∈ SBR (resp. σ ∈ SA) that approaches B(F,δ).
Remark 2 Observe that if F is approachable with bounded-recall strategies
(or with automata), then so is any set that contains F. Also, if the closure
of F is approachable with bounded-recall strategies (or with automata), then
so is F.
Remark 3 By Remark 1, every set approachable with bounded-recall strate-
gies is also approachable with automata. As stated in Corollary 1 below, the
converse is also true.
2.3 No-Regret and Approachability
Consider a sequential decision problem, where the decision maker (DM)
chooses at every stage n an action from a ﬁnite set I. When DM chooses i,
he receives a stage-reward ui,j, where j is the current state of nature. We
assume that the set J of possible states of nature is ﬁnite, and that the
evolution of the state of nature is independent of the actions chosen by DM.
We denote by it the action chosen by DM at stage t, and by jt the state
of nature at that stage. At each stage n, DM can compare the actual average
payoﬀ up to stage n, ¯ xn =
Pn
t=1 uit,jt
n , with the payoﬀ he would have gotten




n . DM has no-regret
7at stage n if ¯ xn ≥ ri
n, for each i ∈ I. A strategy σ is Hannan no-regret if
for every sequence j1,j2,... of states of nature and every n suﬃciently large,
DM has no-regret at stage n. Formally,
Deﬁnition 3 Let δ ≥ 0. A strategy σ is Hannan δ-no-regret if for every









A Hannan 0-no-regret strategy is also termed Hannan no-regret strategy.
The fact that σ is Hannan no-regret means that against any sequence of
states of nature, the long-run average payoﬀ is at least the average payoﬀ
DM could have achieved had he known in advance the empirical frequencies
of the various states of nature, and played a best response against it.
Observe that the set of strategies of DM in a sequential decision problem
coincides with the set of strategies of player 1 in a two-player game where
the actions of the two players are I and J respectively.
It is well known that a strategy is Hannan no-regret if and only if it
approaches the non-negative orthant in a proper two-player game with vector-
payoﬀs. Deﬁne the following vector-payoﬀ game. The action sets of the two
players are I and J respectively. The payoﬀ matrix M, with entries in R|I|,
is given by mi,j = (ui,j − ua,j)a∈I.
Let F = {(x1,x2,...,x|I|): xi ≥ 0,i = 1,...,|I|} be the non-negative or-
thant. Then if a strategy σ of player 1 approaches F, it is Hannan no-regret,
and vice-versa. Since by Hannan (1957) there is a Hannan no-regret strategy,
F is approachable. However, showing directly that F is approachable and
thereby proving the existence of a Hannan no-regret strategy is easier than
Hannan’s original proof.
An historical note. Luce and Raiﬀa (1957, p. 482) cite Blackwell’s
(1956b) proof of Hannan no-regret theorem that uses the approachability
theorem. Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) were the ﬁrst to note that no-regret
8theorems can be proven, using Blackwell’s approachability theorem, by bring-
ing the regret vector to the non-negative orthant.
2.4 The Main Results
We are now ready to state our main results. The ﬁrst two propositions refer
to approachability.
Proposition 1 A set that contains a convex approachable set is approachable
with automata.
Proposition 2 Let F be a set that contains a convex approachable set.
Then for every k ∈ N there is a k-bounded-recall strategy that approaches
B(F,O( 1 √
k)).2.
The following Proposition completes the characterization of sets which
are approachable with bounded-recall strategies, or with automata.
Proposition 3 A closed set that does not contain any convex approachable
set is not approachable with automata.
Propositions 1 and 3 imply the following characterization of convex min-
imal approachable sets in terms of approachability with bounded computa-
tional capacity strategies.
Theorem 1 A minimal closed approachable set is approachable with bounded-
recall strategies, or with automata, if and only if it is convex.
Remark 3, together with Propositions 2 and 3, implies the following.
Corollary 1 A set is approachable with automata if and only if it is ap-
proachable with bounded-recall strategies.
2Formally, there is a constant C > 0, independent of F, such that for every k ∈ N,
there is a k-bounded-recall strategy σ that approaches B(F, C √
k)
9Translated to the setup of sequential decision problems, we can derive the
following results.
Corollary 2 In every sequential decision problem, for every δ > 0 there is
a Hannan δ-no-regret strategy that can be implemented by an automaton.
Corollary 3 In every sequential decision problem, there is a constant C
such that for every k ∈ N there is a Hannan C √
k-no-regret k-bounded-recall
strategy.
3 Approachability with Bounded Computa-
tional Capacity
3.1 Approachability with automata
Here we prove Proposition 1, which states that any set F that contains a
convex approachable set is approachable with automata. We then bound the
size of the smallest automaton that approaches B(F,δ), as a function of δ.
Proof of Proposition 1: By Remark 2, it is suﬃcient to prove that every
convex approachable set is approachable with automata.
Let F be a convex approachable set. Then, there is a strategy σ of player
1 such that3
∀ε,∃n,∀τ, Pσ,τ(d(¯ xn,F) ≥ ε/2) ≤ ε/2. (1)
Fix ε > 0, and let n be the minimal integer that satisﬁes (1) for that ε.
Suppose that player 1 plays in blocks of size n. At the beginning of
each block he forgets past play, and plays the strategy σ (for n stages). We
now argue that the resulting strategy, σ∗, which can be implemented by an
automaton with
|I×J|n−1
|I×J|−1 states, approaches B(F,ε).
Let Yk be the average payoﬀ in block k. Let τk be the strategy of player
2 used in that block. τk is a random variable that depends on the play in
3Observe that this statement is much weaker than the one given in Deﬁnition 1.
10previous blocks. The distribution of Yk is similar to the distribution of ¯ xn
under (σ,τk), so that by (1) Pσ∗,τ(d(Yk,H) ≥ ε/2) ≤ ε/2. Since payoﬀs are
bounded by 1, Eσ∗,τ[d(Yk,F)] ≤ ε for every k ∈ N.
Denote by Hk the algebra over the space of inﬁnite plays spanned by
all the cylinders that are deﬁned by histories up to block k. The random
variables (Yk − Eσ∗,τ[Yk | Hk])k∈N are centered, uncorrelated, and uniformly
bounded by 1. Denote Y k = 1
k
Pk
l=1 Yl the average payoﬀ in the ﬁrst l blocks.
By the strong law of large numbers, and since F is convex, for every δ > 0





d(Y k,F) ≥ ε + δ

< δ.





d(¯ xk,F) ≥ ε + 2δ

< δ.
In particular, σ∗ approaches B(F,ε).
For every pair (p,q) of mixed actions (i.e., distributions over the respective
action sets), denote by mp,q =
P
i,j pimi,jqj the expected vector-payoﬀ. This
is the expected stage-payoﬀ when player 1 plays the mixed action p and
player 2 plays the mixed action q.
For every vector x ∈ Rd and every set A, denote by pA(x) a mixed action
of player 1 that satisﬁes, for some y ∈ A, (i) d(x,y) = d(x,A), and (ii) for
every mixed action q of player 2, hx−y,mpA(x),q−yi ≤ 0.4 Graphically, if y is
a closest point to x in A, the condition means that the hyperplane that passes
through y, and is perpendicular to the line that connects x and y, separates x
from the set H(pA(x)) = {mpA(x),q: q ∈ ∆(J)}. Thus, if the average payoﬀ so
far, ¯ xn, is not in A, and player 1 plays the mixed action pA(¯ xn), the expected
stage-payoﬀ is in H(pA(¯ xn)), regardless of the mixed action of player 2. Since
the hyperplane that passes through y and is perpendicular to the line that
4For x,y ∈ Rd, hx,yi =
Pd
i=1 xiyi is the standard inner product.
11connects ¯ xn and y, separates ¯ xn from the set H(pA(¯ xn)), on average, the new
average payoﬀ will get closer to A.
Remark 4 Blackwell (1956a) showed that if F is a convex approachable set,
then the strategy σ that plays at every stage n the mixed action pF(¯ xn) ap-
proaches F at a rate O(1/
√
n), that is, there is a constant C > 0, inde-
pendent of F, such that for every strategy τ of player 2, and every n ∈ N,
Eσ,τ(d(¯ xn,F)) ≤ C/
√
n.
Using this speciﬁc strategy σ in the proof of Proposition 1 with n > 1 √
ε,
yields an explicit automaton that approaches B(F,ε).
Remark 5 A na¨ ıve estimate for the number of states of the automaton
needed to implement the strategy σ∗ that was suggested in the proof of Propo-
sition 1 and approaches B(F,O( 1 √
n)), given the strategy σ that approaches
H and discussed in Remark 4, is cn, where c = |I × J|. As we argue now,
the number of states is much smaller.
Since the mixed action σ plays at each stage k < n depends on the average
payoﬀ up to that stage, the number of states of an automaton needed to
implement the prescription of σ∗ at stage k of the block is bounded by the
number of diﬀerent empirical distributions of joint actions. By Feller (1968,
Eq. (II.5.2)), the number of diﬀerent empirical distributions of joint actions




. Therefore, by Feller (1968, Eq. (II.12.8)), one










, which is of the order of nc. Consequently, for any F that contains
the convex hull of an approachable set, player 1 can approach B(F,O(n− 1
2c))
with an automaton of size n.
Corollary 2 can therefore be strengthened as follows. In every sequential
decision problem, for every δ > 0 there is a Hannan δ-no-regret strategy that
can be implemented by an automaton of size O(log 1
δ).
123.2 Approachability with bounded-recall strategies
Here we prove Proposition 2, which states that any set F that contains a
convex approachable set is approachable with bounded-recall strategies.
Proof of Proposition 2: By Remark 2, we can assume w.l.o.g. that F is
a convex approachable set.
Let σ be the strategy that approaches F and was discussed in Remark
4. Then there is C > 0 such that for every n ∈ N, Eσ,τ[d(¯ xn,F)] ≤ C √
n, for
every strategy τ of player 2.
Fix n ∈ N. Let σ∗ be the strategy we constructed in the proof of Propo-
sition 1 given σ, with blocks of size n. Our goal is to show that σ∗, when
properly modiﬁed, is an n-bounded-recall strategy, and that it approaches
B(F,O( 1 √
n)).
Denote by ` the smallest integer larger than
√
n. Let i0 and i1 be two
distinct actions of player 1.
Given the strategy σ∗, that plays in blocks of size n, we now construct an
augmented n-bounded-recall strategy b σ, that, in a sense, also plays in blocks
of size n.
Marking the beginning of the block: The beginning of each block is
marked by a sequence of ` consecutive actions i0 of player 1. Thus, if the
past n−1 actions of player 1 do not contain a sequence of ` consecutive i0’s,
player 1 plays the action i0.
Marking the end of the block: The end of the block is marked by the
action i1 of player 1. Thus, if the past n − 1 actions of player 1 end with a
sequence of ` consecutive i0’s, player 1 plays the action i1.5
To ensure that the only sequence of ` consecutive i0’s appears at the
beginning of the block, whenever the past n−1 actions of player 1 contain a
sequence of ` consecutive i0’s, and the last ` − 1 actions player 1 played are
5The role of this part is to ensure that the block does not end with action i0, in which
case we will count this action as part of the beginning of the next block.
13all i0, player 1 plays the action i1.6
Each stage in which player 1 plays the action i1 instead of some other
action, as well as each of the ` stages in which he plays i0 to mark the
beginning of the block, is called an irregular stage. Observe that there are
at most 2` irregular stages in each block.
Playing at all other stages: Denote by h the partial history from the
beginning of the block to the present stage. Denote by h0 the history h, after
removing all pairs of actions that correspond to irregular stages. Under b σ
player 1 plays after the history h the same mixed action σ∗ plays after h0.
The virtual memory: The virtual memory of the strategy may be any
sequence in (I×J)n which contains only at its end a sequence of ` consecutive
stages in which player 1 played i0. This ensures that the ﬁrst block starts
at stage 1, and that apart from this fact, the virtual memory does not aﬀect
the play.
Let Yk be the expected payoﬀ vector during block k. Since there are at













The argument provided in the proof of Proposition 1 implies that σ∗ ap-
proaches B(F, C+3 √
n ).
Remark 6 It would be more elegant to prove Proposition 2 by a strategy




c=1 xk−c is the average payoﬀ in the last n stages. However, we have not
been able to prove that this strategy approaches B(H,O( 1 √
n)).
6In particular, at stage ` + 1 of the block the action i1 is played by player 1.
143.3 Completing the Characterization of Approachable
Sets
Here we prove Proposition 3, which states that a closed set F that does not
contain any convex approachable set is not approachable with automata.
For every x ∈ Rd and every δ > 0, B0(x,δ) = {y ∈ Rd: d(x,y) < δ} is
the open ball with radius δ around x.
When A is an automaton, and p is a probability distribution over the
states of the automaton, we denote by (A,p) the automaton that is similar
to A, except that its initial probability distribution is p (rather than the one
indicated by A).
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose to the contrary that F is approachable
with automata. Let G ⊆ F be minimal (w.r.t. set inclusion) among all closed
subsets of F that are approachable with automata. As the intersection of
any decreasing sequence of closed sets that are approachable with automata
is approachable with automata, Zorn’s Lemma guarantees the existence of
such a set.
Step 1: G is not convex. G is approachable with automata and therefore
it is an approachable set. Since F does not contain a convex approachable
set, G is not convex. Therefore, there are x,y ∈ G and λ ∈ [0,1] such that
z := λx + (1 − λ)y 6∈ G. Since G is closed, one can choose δ ∈ (0,1/4) such
that d(x,y) ≥ δ and d(z,G) > 3δ.
The set G \ B0(x,δ) is non-empty (as it contains y), closed, and a strict
subset of G. Since G is minimal among all closed sets which are approachable
with automata, G \ B0(x,δ) is not approachable with automata. Similarly,
the set G \ B0(y,δ) is not approachable with automata.
This implies that there is δ0 < δ/4 such that there is no automaton that
approaches the sets B(G \ B0(x,δ),δ0) and B(G \ B0(y,δ),δ0).
As G is approachable with automata, there is an automaton A that ap-
proaches B(G,
δ0
2 ). We will deﬁne a strategy τ of player 2 that, when plays
against A, guarantees that the average payoﬀ visits B0(z,2δ) inﬁnitely often.
15This implies that G is not approachable by A, a contradiction.7
For every n ∈ N deﬁne the random variables pn as the posterior prob-
ability distribution over the states of the automaton at stage n, given past
play. Denote by PA the union of the range of pn, over all n ∈ N. PA contains
all possible beliefs player 2 may have along the game about the current state
of the automaton.
Since A approaches B(G,
δ0
2 ), the deﬁnition of approachability implies
that so does (A,p), for every p ∈ PA.
Step 2: Constructing a family of strategies (τx
p)p∈PA. Our ﬁrst goal is
to deﬁne, for every p ∈ PA, a strategy τx
p of player 2 that ensures that the
average payoﬀ gets close to x when playing against (A,p).
Formally, we will deﬁne for every p ∈ PA a strategy τx








δ) = 1. (2)
That is, the long-run average payoﬀ under ((A,p),τx
p) gets arbitrarily close
to B(x, 3
2δ).
Fix p ∈ PA. Since the automaton (A,p) approaches B(G,
δ0
2 ), for every
η > 0 there is a positive integer Np,η such that
∀τ, P(A,p),τ( sup
n≥Np,η
d(¯ xn,G) ≥ δ0) ≤ η. (3)
Since the automaton (A,p) does not approach B(G \ B0(x,δ),δ0), there is
ηp > 0 such that for every N ∈ N there is a strategy τN,p of player 2 satisfying
P(A,p),τN,p(sup
n≥N
d(¯ xN,B(G \ B0(x,δ))) ≥ δ0) ≥ ηp. (4)
By substituting η = ηp/2 in (3), and N ≥ Np,ηp/2 in (4), we obtain
P(A,p),τN,p(sup
n≥N







7Actually, we will show that the average payoﬀ remains in B0(z,2δ) from some point
on.








For every ﬁxed strategy τ of player 2, every n ∈ N, and every c > 0,
the function p0 7→ P(A,p0),τ(d(¯ xn,x) ≥ c) is linear (and Lipschitz-1) in p0.
As the space of probability distributions over the states of the automaton
is compact, one can assume w.l.o.g. that η∗ := infp∈PA ηp > 0 and KN :=
supp∈PA KN,p < ∞.
We will show that since for every p ∈ PA (5) holds, for every p ∈ PA
there is a strategy τx
p that satisﬁes (2). The strategy τx
p will play in blocks of
varying size. Let bl be the stage in which block l starts, so that πl := pbl is
the posterior probability over the states of the automaton at the beginning of
block l, given past play. At the beginning of each block, τx
p forgets past play,
and during block l it follows τbl/δ2,πl. The length of block l is the minimum
between Kbl/δ2 and the minimal n ≥ bl/δ2 such that the average payoﬀ in




2δ, in every block there is a probability greater than η∗/4
such that the average payoﬀ at the end of the block is in B(x, 3
2δ). Since
block l lasts at least bl/δ2 stages, it implies that the length of block l is much
greater than the length of the history preceding it. Thus, the average payoﬀ
at the last stage of block l is close to the average payoﬀ obtained during block
l and the claim follows.
Step 3: Constructing the family (τy
p)p∈PA. Replacing x by y in Step 2
we conclude that for every p ∈ PA there is a strategy τy








δ))) = 1. (6)
Step 4: Constructing the strategy τ. For every p ∈ PA choose Np ∈ N
such that P(A,p),τx
p(d(¯ xn,x) ≤ 7




p( d(¯ xn,y) ≤ 7
4δ for some n ≤ Np) ≥ 1− δ
4. As before, since the space
17of probabilities over the states of the automaton is compact, we can assume
w.l.o.g. that N∗ = supp∈PA Np < +∞.
Deﬁne a strategy τ that plays in blocks of random size as follows. At
block l player 2 forgets past play, and either follows τx
p (in which case we call
the block an X-block), or τy
p (in which case we call the block a Y -block).
The block terminates when either (i) the average-payoﬀ along the block is
within 7
4δ of x (in an X-block) or of y (in a Y -block), or (ii) as soon as the
block lasts for N∗ stages, whichever comes ﬁrst. The decision whether the
new block is an X-block or a Y -block is done according to the proportion of
past stages that were spent in X-blocks. If the proportion is smaller than
λ, the present block will be an X-block, whereas if it at least λ, the present
block will be a Y -block.
The probability that the average payoﬀ in an X-block (resp. Y -block) is
within 7
4δ of x (resp. y) is at least 1− δ
4. Since payoﬀs are bounded by 1, and
by the strong law of large numbers, this construction ensures that if player
2 follows τ the long-run average payoﬀ remains in B0(z,2δ) from some stage
on. This implies in particular that G is not approachable and the proof is
ﬁnished.
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